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IN THE, SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES E. RICHMOND, Executor 
of the Estate of WILLIAM B. OUT-
CALT, Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
vs. 
IVIE W. BALLARD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
8755 
We agree substantially with appellant's "Statement 
of the Case" as far as it goes. However, because the 
statement is not complete and because appellant departed 
from the issues as state~ both at the trial and in her 
brief on appeal, we will make a short statement. 
The suit was commenced to set aside a deed obtained 
by I vie W. Ballard from the deceased. Appellant's state-
ment is that this was upon the ground that the deed 
was procured by "undue influence." We wish to add that 
the complaint also alleged that "his mental capacity had 
debilitated to the point where it was relatively easy for 
his will to be influenced, dominated and overcome" and 
"that he required medical attention and was given drugs 
for the purpose of relieving pain and acquiring sleep 
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and rest." The findings of the court based upon the 
allegations and the evidence were that "he was adminis-
tered drugs for the purpose of alleviating his pain and 
was given sleeping pills each night; that there was a 
period daily between the time of taking said sleeping 
pills and the time that he went to sleep that he was 
incompetent to transact business ..... That at the time 
said William B. Outcalt signed said deed he either had 
no knowledge of what he was signing or said signature 
was procured by undue influence and was not the volun-
tary or legal act of said William B. Outcalt; that at said 
time said William B. Outcalt w.as incapable of making 
a gift or of entering into any agreement with respect 
to said property." The grounds for setting aside the deed 
were therefore broader than mere "undue influence." 
There was evidence of and 1nuch argument based 
upon an agreement which \Yas embodied in a codicil to 
the decedent's will, the codicil being Exhibit 5 and dated 
December 31, 1953. The facts of this transaction were put 
in eYidence without objection by either .side. This was 
material on the validity of the deed. But there is no 
issue of reroYery on a contract. X ot only was none framed 
h~· the pleadings, but there could be none for the reason 
that no clai1n was filed under Section 15-9--1, l'tah Code 
Annotated, 1953. Tllis section provides : 
"75-9-4. CLAIM:S TO BE PRESEXTED 
\Yl TlllN Til\IE LI~IITS-EXCEPTIOKS.-All 
daims arising upon rontrart, whether the same 
arP due, not due or contingent, n1ust be presented 
within the tilne lilnited in the notice, and any 
clailn not presented is barred forever; .... " 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
See also Halloran Judge Trust Company vs. Heath, 70 
Utah 124, 258 Pac. 342. 
Mrs. Ballard did claim an agreement had been made 
which embodied the codicil. But such f.acts and circum-
stances are relevant in this case only as they furnish 
evidentiary matter for the determination of whether or 
not the deed of September 30, 1954, Exhibit 1, was 
properly secured. As will be pointed out, the codicil is 
material in establishing a course of conduct and motives. 
Whether or not Mrs. Ballard rendered service or whether 
she carried out her agreement is not material from a 
contractual point of view. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. General Chronological Statement. 
B. Mr. Outcalt's Physic.al Condition. 
C. Mr. Outcalt's Mental Condition. 
D. Relationship of Parties. 
E. Simulated Controversy Between Mrs. Ballard, 
the Richmonds and Mrs. Brooke. 
F. Third-Party Testimony Regarding Execution of 
Deed. 
A. GENERAL CHRONOLOGICAL STATEMENT. 
Appellant's statement of facts is so incomplete that 
we deem it necessary to make a full statement. We differ 
in some respects with appellant'~ statement. 
\Villiam B. Outcalt on September 30, 1954, the date 
of the purported deed in question (Exhibit 1), w.as 86 
years of age. He had no living blood relatives. :Mrs. Annie 
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Brooke was his surviving niece by marriage, her hus-
band having been the nephew of Mr. Outcalt. His wife had 
died in 1950. Mr. Outcalt became sick in March 1953 and 
was hospitalized and operated on for the partial re-
moval of an incurable tumor (Tr. 50-51). On May 2, 1953 
he executed a "Last Will and Testament" in which he 
left all of his estate "To Annie C. Brooke of Pasadena, 
California, widow of my nephew Lloyd W. Brooke" (Ex-
hibit 3). 
Mrs. Ivie W. Ballard, the defendant and appellant 
took care of him for a short time in July and August 
of 1952 (Tr. 183). She again went to his house to care 
for him December 24, 1953 and he continued under her 
care until his death March 9, 1956 (Tr. 183). However, 
they were some time making arrangements for her to 
stay. Prior to the final arrangements she talked to him 
many times .about a will or codicil (Tr. 183). She learned 
at that time that he had approximately $5,000.00 in money 
or valid obligations owing to him (Tr. 300). She sug-
gested that they go to )Ir. l\Iacfarlane, her attorney, to 
have the codicil drawn which they did in October 1953 
( Tr. 18-l). She and l\fr. Outcalt went to )Ir. )facfarlane's 
'Office in October to discuss the matter (Tr. 188). Some-
time after October 1~, she picked up a draft of the instru-
rnent (Tr. 188). The draft wa.s returned to )Ir. Mac-
farlane December 24, 1953 (Tr. 189). This was the day 
on 'vhich she started to take care of hhn. She testified 
that the draft w.as corrected by l\[r. Outcalt in his own 
handwriting (Tr. 189, Exhibit 17). ("Te do not admit the 
<'orrections to be in his handwriting). The codicil was 
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signed in Mr. Macfarlane's office December 31, 1953 
( Tr. 190, Exhibit 5). The codicil provided that Annie 
C. Brooke should receive his household and personal 
effects. The re.sidue of the estate was left to I vie Ballard 
under certain conditions. These conditions were as fol-
lows: 
" .... on condition, however, that she person-
ally .attend to my desires and needs for the re-
mainder of my life; all expenses to be taken first 
from my funds and in the event they are ex-
hausted then from the personal funds of said I vie 
Ballard. 
"If this condition be not fulfilled, this devise 
shall lapse and the portion of my residue so alloted 
(sic) shall pass to Annie C. Brooke or her heirs. 
The determination of whether I vie Ballard has 
fulfilled the above mentioned condition shall rest 
exclusively with my executor hereinafter named." 
Walker Bank & Trust Company was named as exe-
cutor. 
She testified that she was not to otherwise be paid 
for taking care of him (Tr. 187). Nevertheless, she was 
paid money from January 1954 (or possibly December 
24, 1953) to the time of his death. She did not discuss 
the codicil with anyone (Tr. 187). 
Under date of January 4, 1954, just four days after 
signing the codicil, l\f r. Outcalt executed an olographic 
will (Exhibit 4). This will was found in his safety deposit 
box at the Sugar House Branch of Walker Bank & Trust 
Co., which also contained the will of May, 1953 (Tr. 
90, 94). The olographic will has been admitted to probate 
and now constitutes the last will and testament of William 
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B. Outcalt (Tr. 94, 96). There was no contest of this 
will. The olographic will names Charles E. Richmond 
as the sole executor to serve without bond as did the 
will of May 1953 (Exhibits 3 and 4). It expressly annuls 
and cancels all previous wills. One-third of his estate 
is given to Annie C. Brooke of Pasadena, plus all of his 
pers-onal effects which she may choose. Ivie Ballard is 
given one-third of the residue and the remaining one-
third is given to Annie C. Brooke in trust to be distri-
buted to a list of "my dear and helpful friends whose 
names I have furnished her with the proportion of said 
one-third of my estate which I wish paid to each one." 
A list of persons specifying their proportionate share of 
the one-third was admitted to probate with the will and 
is part thereof (Exhibit 4). It shows that )Ir. and ~Irs. 
Richmond received twenty per cent of the one-third. 
Mrs. Ballard during the entire illness, received $25 
per month for food, medicines and drugs (Tr. 110, 311). 
When she requested it she received additional money for 
such purposes ( Tr. 110). Conunencing with December :2±, 
1953 or January 1, 1954 she received $~5 per month for 
services out of l\Ir. Outcalt's funds (Tr. 11±). "\Yhile she 
claim~ that she did not want to take any pay she never 
refused it (Tr. 115). Starting in July 195±, by check 
dated August 2, the anwunt was increased to $100 per 
1nonth (Tr. 11-t). This w.as at the suggestion of ~Irs. 
B1·ooke after eon~nltation with ~Ir. Outcalt (Tr. 130, 
180). The $100 per nwnth continued through January 
whPn it was reduced to $50 at the suggestion of ~Ir. 
Outealt (Tr. 114). She was paid $75 per n1onth from 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
March 1955 until the time of his death. The checks paya-
ble to Mrs. Ballard were intfloduced as Exhibit 13. A 
list of the checks was introduced as Exhibit 14 (Tr. 
115). The checks from January to July 2, 1954 were 
signed by Wm. B. Outcalt. From August 2, 1954 until 
his death the checks were all signed by Mr. or Mrs. 
Richmond. The Richmonds were authorized to sign checks 
and to draw on his savings account (Tr. 98-99, Exhibits 
6 and 7). Mr. and Mrs. Richmond had a power of attorney 
executed in July 1949 by Mr. Outcalt and his wife (See 
Exhibit: 2, Tr. 87). 
Mr. Outcalt had a very serious illness in July and 
August of 1954 (Tr. 54-55). He made a substantial re-
covery in September of 1954 (Tr. 58). In. the month of 
September he arranged to receive the balance owing on 
a real estate contract between him and Mr. Siggard (Tr. 
171-172). It was testified that he had Mary Glen (true 
spelling Glenn), who generally did such work for him, 
prepare the deeds (Tr. 172, 306). These deeds were dated 
September 22, 1954, just eight days before the deed in 
question. The following is Mrs. Ballard's own testimony 
as to his custom of having Mary Glen do his stenographir 
work: 
"Q. Well who conducted the settlement with 
the Siggards~ · 
"A. Well Mrs. Mary Glen was supposed to 
have made the deed out and she was a favorite of 
Mr. Outcalts .and he wanted her always to do his 
business; you know, any typing or fixing up he 
always went to Mary Glen. And so he wanted her 
to fix this up." (Tr. 305-306). 
He signed the deeds to Mr. Siggard in the presence 
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of Lillian D. McConnell and Esther M. Richmond (Tr. 
171), who took them to Mr. William Ferguson for notari-
zati'On (Tr. 171-172). The deeds were returned to Mr. 
Outcalt by Mrs. Richmond (Tr. 172). Mr. Outcalt appar-
ently delivered them to Mr. Siggard. The Siggard deeds 
were introduced in evidence and are Exhibits 9 and 10. 
On September 30, 1954, l\1:r. Outcalt signed the deed 
in question, the original deed being introduced in evidence 
as Exhibit 1. 
Exhibit 1, the deed in question, was not typed by 
~Iary Glen as in the case of Exhibits 9 and 10, but by 
:Mrs. Grace Dent at the request of Mr.s. Ballard (Tr. 84). 
The description was prepared from a tax notice (Tr. 
291). ::Mrs. Ballard testified that after she had taken the 
deed to l\frs. Dent for typing she returned to Mr. Outcalt 
f'Or his signature (Tr. 291). She then took the deed to 
~Irs. Luchesi to be notarized, who refused to notarize it 
without a witness (Tr. ~91). )Irs. Ballard then went to 
the house of ~Ir. George E. Dent and took him in her car 
driven by her daughter to the house of )Irs. Luchesi. 
Mr. Dent then signed as a witness without having seen 
l\f r. Outcalt sign, or even knowing him. Mrs. Luchesi then 
notarized the instrun1ent also without seeing or talking 
to Mr. Outcalt. l\[rs. Luchesi filled in the date of Sep-
teinber 30, lD5-! ( Tr. 80). l\fr. and l\Irs. Dent and l\Irs. 
Luchesi are neighbors and friends of )Irs. Ballard, living 
approxi1nately one block from her, their addresses being, 
l\f rs. Dent, GG:2 South 7th East (':rr. 7:2) : l\frs. Luchesi, 
();~7 East 7th South (Tr. 79): l\lrs. Ballard, 656 South 
7th East (Tr. :212). Their hmnes .are approxin1ately two 
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miles from the Outcalt re.sidence, which is at Redondo 
Avenue and Sixth East Street. The deed then remained 
in Mrs. Ballard's possession until March 10, 1956, one 
day after the death of Mr. Outcalt, at which time she 
recorded it (Tr. 232, Exhibit 1). 
Under date of December 1, 1954, Mr. Outcalt wrote 
a letter addressed to the "Administr.ator of My Estate" 
which letter was entirely in his handwriting (Tr. 138). 
"Dec. 1, 1954 
"To the Administrator 'Of My Estate 
"Please settle my estate according to the 
terms of my olographic will written and signed by 
me last January. The provisions of this will are 
just to all concerned and I wish them carried out, 
ignoring .and cancelling all other papers which I 
may have signed under undue pressure and fear 
of being left alone. 
William B. Outcalt" 
This letter was found after Mr. Outcalt's death in 
a drawer of a desk approximately two feet from his bed 
(Tr. 170). 
Mr. Outcalt'.s funds were substantially exhausted be-
fore he died, he having only $150 in checking account, 
$59.47 in savings account and $100 cash in safety box 
(Tr. 102-103). His estate, in addition to the house, the 
title to which is in question, was valued at not to exceed 
$1,000 consisting principally of real estate in Emigration 
Canyon, in Tooel-e County and in Box Elder County, which 
properties the executor has not been able to sell (Tr. 
104-107). The funeral expenses of $388 have not yet 
been paid (Tr. 107). 
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B. MR. OUTCALT'S PHYSICAL CONDITION. 
It is admitted that in April 1953 Mr. Outcalt Wal 
hospitalized and operated on for a rare tumor. It wru 
impossible to remove it entirely and it was incnr.abl€ 
(Tr. 51). Appellant states on page 4 that "Outcalt con-
tinued to improve from the latter part of August 1953 
until shortly before his death." His death was on March 
9, 1956 (and not ~iarch 17, 1956 as stated by appellant). 
Since we assert that 1Ir. Outcalt's condition gradually 
became worse and not better, as stated in appellant's 
brief, page 4, we will outline the evidence with regard 
to his physical condition. 
He wa~ cared for by Dr. John S. Marshall, who 
first treated him in ~Iarch 1953 (Tr. 50). With regard 
to pain, the doctor stated: 
"A. \Yell the pain produced by his tumor 
can be severe, was severe initially when we first 
saw him. Large doses of morphine didn~t phase 
it .a bit. Subsequent to that time the pain at times 
was se\ere. but neYer as severe as initially exper-
ienced. The pain is due to pressure on the sacral 
bone and pressure on adjacent nerves, which pro-
duced pain down both legs. It is pain that comes 
and goes. It ahuost alwa~~s would require some 
aid in ih• relief. By aid I 1ue.an a narcotic of some 
sort.·· (Tr. 54). 
II t' had another operation in Decen1ber 1953, two in 
,fanuar~· of 19:1-t. and was seriously ill in July and ~lugust 
or 1!);)-1- (Tr. 54-55). The July and 4-\.ugust illness was 
dP:-;<'ribed a~ critical by the doctor, but the doctor did 
not think lw was going to die at that tin1e (Tr. 55). He 
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was blind to the extent that he could not re.ad except 
~It through a magnifying glass (Tr. 66). Mr. Richmond 
i.l:: testined that his recovery from the January 1954 opera-
~';: tions was quite rapid. He was 'up and around" subse-
~· quent to that time. In July he was taken ill again .and 
T( was in bed f·or a number of weeks which lasted from the 
·m~ middle of July to the latter part of September. His re-
~~ covery and ability to get out of bed lasted a short time 
~l: when he returned to bed and was bedfast substantially 
~r~ until de.ath (Tr. 98). He had to be lift.ed around (Tr. 
th 267). Last time he got out of bed was summer of 1955 
(Tr. 268). Mrs. Ballard gave testimony at great length 
!1,: as to the extent of the care that was required. 
:w:: We assert there is .absolutely no basis for the state-
l,r 
:or. 
ment on page 4 of appellant's brief that "Outcalt con-
tinued to improve from the latter part of August 1953 
until shortly before his death." 
·C. MR. OUTCALT'S MENTAL CONDITION. 
Before referring to the evidence on this subject we 
wish to state that we do not contend that Mr. Outcalt's 
mind ever deteriorated to the point that he was totally 
and permanently incompetent. Any incompetency was 
from extreme physical illness, crucial pain, physical de-
pendency on others and at such times as he was under 
the influence of drugs. In this connection we call attention 
to Section 7;}-13-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which 
defines an incompetent for the purpose of appointing 
a guardian, .as follows: 
"75-13-20. INCOMPETENT PERSONS-
DEFINITIONS. - The words 'inemnpetent,' 
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'mentally incompetent' and 'incapable,' as used in 
this title, shall be construed to mean any person 
who, though not insane, is, by reason of old age, 
disease, weakness of mind, or from any other 
cause, unable, unassisted, to properly manage and 
take care of himself or his property, and by reason 
thereof would be likely to be deceived or imposed 
upon by artful or designing persons." 
The following is the doctor's testimony as to his con-
dition in the summer of 1954: 
"A. Well, his tumor began to recur again 
in lVIay of '54 and produced pain. Again we urged 
that he come to the hospital and let us attempt its 
removal in part, at least, which would relieve his 
pain. However, he declined to do that. As the 
pain became more pronounced, more steady and 
more severe, he required larger doses of pain re-
lieving medicine, so that he was unable to eat and 
he rapidly lost strength and became practically 
bedfast." (Tr. 55). 
As for the use of drugs, the doctor testified: 
,. A. He would norn1ally or usually take two 
capsules of sodiun1 amytal of three grain size, 
on around I :00 in the evening, at which tune he 
"·ished to go to sleep for the night. That dose 
would be six grains of sodium amytal. Occasion-
ally he would take an additional capsule in the 
1niddle of the night and endeavor to sleep until 
morning. The duration of these drugs is from six 
to eight hours. If one is in pain you will awake 
even at a shorter time than that, but "ith the six 
hour tinw inteiT.al. as you can see, ~Ir. Outcalt 
would awaken in the middle of the night and he 
would often require a second five grains before 
nwrning, so that during the night he would get 
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nine grains of sodium amytal, the pain tablet 
called percodan, that is a relatively mild pain 
relieving drug, it is synthetic opiate and was well 
tolerated by him. He took large amounts of aspirin 
compounds, too." (Tr. 55-56). 
With respect to the dosage, the following is the 
question and answer: 
"Q. Now relative to the sleeping pills and 
the dosage you have mentioned is that a relatively 
heavy dose or a light dose, Doctor~ 
"A. That is a whale of a dose. 
"Q. That is larger than you normally are 
required to give a p,atient ~ 
"A. Yes sir, it is." (Tr. 56). 
With respect to his competency when taking drugs 
the doctor stated : 
"After two or three hours when the medicine 
was in full effect I wouldn't think he would be 
very competent." (Tr. 57). 
There would be a time when he would be very foggy 
(Tr. 57). He was totally dependent on Mrs. Ballard 
(Tr. 57). 
He was given hypodermic injections of demerol, 
"which is a more potent opiate for more severe pain 
when this percodan didn't give him full relief." (Tr. 64). 
The doctor never saw him during the height of the 
drug action (Tr. 68). On a direct question the doctor 
testified that there would be a period during the time 
of the drug action when he was incompetent to tr.ansact 
business (Tr. 71). 
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Mr. Richmond te_stified that there were occasions 
when Mr. Outcalt did not know him and would ask who 
the visitor was (Tr. 109). Mr. and Mrs. Richmond hand-
led all of his business affairs during most of the illness 
(Tr. 98). There were times when Mr. Richmond would 
try to talk to Mr. Outcalt about his busine_ss and he 
would say, "I don't want to talk about it." There were 
other times when he was not able to talk about ·business 
affairs (Tr. 109). He told ~Ir. Richmond to conduct 
his affairs as he wanted to after July 1954 (Tr. 122). 
D. RELATIONSHIP OF PARTIES. 
Because, as will hereinafter be pointed out, Mrs. 
Ballard tried to create the impre.ssion at the trial that 
the Richmonds were not ~Ir. Outcalt's friends, but were 
antagonistic to him and ~Irs. Ballard, it is important to 
determine the true relationship ·of the parties. "'rith 
the possible exception of ~Irs. Brooke there was no one 
besides Mrs. Ballard who expected to receive anything 
fr01n :Jf r. Outcalt's estate. The Richmonds had known 
:J[r. Outcalt since 1925 (Tr. S7). ~Ir. Richmond knew of 
the l\Iay 1953 will which gave all of the estate to .Annie 
C. Brooke. It nanred ~Ir. Riclnnond as the executor 
(Exhibit 3). The Rich1nonds knew nothing of the codicil 
nor of the olographic will (Tr. 1~0). The Richmonds 
<'X}Wrtrrl nothing. The Rielnnonds Yisited hi1u often and 
faithfully managed his business affairs (Tr. 98, 99, 100, 
107, 109, 119, 180). 1\fr. Richnrond was a party to in-
<'n'a~ing- t hr pay of l\[ rs. Ballard in July of 1954 as was 
AnniP C. Brooke (Tr. 130). The Riclnnonds were neigh-
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bors of Mr. Outcalt, living only a few houses away at 
563 Redondo Avenue (Tr. 86). 
As above pointed out, Mrs. Ballard started taking 
care of Mr. Outcalt on December 24, 1953 with the express 
thought in her mind that she would be paid under the 
terms of the codicil, which was known only to her, and 
her lawyer. She was to care for Mr. Outcalt during his 
life without pay and until his funds were exhausted, 
after which time she was to use her own funds. If this 
were carried out she was to receive the residue of his 
estate (Exhibit 5). As pointed ·out in the statement of 
issues there is no attempt to enforce this agreement. 
If she had claimed anything under this agreement there 
would have been an issue as to the making or validity 
of the agreement, which issue was never tried. Certainly 
there would have been an issue of performance and the 
effect of her receiving pay. The fact that four days after 
the codicil was executed Mr. Outcalt made .an olographic 
will eontrary to the terms of the codicil indicates how 
he felt about the codicil. She knew the approximate 
amount of money on hand at the time of the codicil and 
that such cash would be exhausted if he lived long enough 
and that at such time she would be required to keep 
him with her own money. Mrs. Ballard was in the rela-
tionship of a full time nurse and housekeeper. She pur-
chased and administered the drugs ( Tr. 65, 311). In her 
own language she states: 
"Well I wouldn't say I was a nurse. I went 
there to take care of him and be a housewife and 
make a home." (Tr. 183). 
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The doctor gave Mrs. Ballard instructions for the 
administration of drugs ( Tr. 65). Her attorney stated 
in court that she went there as a nurse ( Tr. 196). 
E. SIMULATED CONTROVERSY BETWEEN MRS. 
BALLARD, THE RICHMONDS AND MRS. BROOKE. 
Mrs. Ballard attempted by her testimony to show 
some controversy between the Richmonds and Mrs. 
Brooke on the one side and herself and Mr. Outcalt on 
the other. Mrs. Ballard's testimony on this is unsupported 
by other testimony and is contrary to other indisputable 
facts. 
Mrs. Ballard testified that in 1953 Mrs. Brooke 
called her up and told her she, )Irs. Ballard, was not 
capable of taking care of him, saying, '·\re have got to 
have a nurse" (Tr. 192). This, if true, need not be taken 
as any personal objection to )Irs. Ballard, but only 
anxiety for Mr. Outcalt's welfare. Howe\er, the testimony 
was as if there was a personal controversy. )Irs. Ballard 
stated that ~Ir. Outcalt said that he had been high pres-
sured many times by the Richmonds and the McConnells 
and he had done things he wished he had not done (Tr. 
193). \Yhat these things were or could have been were 
not diselosed. After testifying that she had taken the 
eodicil out of the safety deposit box at the Continental 
Hank & Trust C01npany, and placed it on the shelf at 
the Outcalt residence, she intimated that the seals on 
the envelope containing the codicil had been disturbed 
b~r l\1 r~. Bielnnond (Tr. :2S7-:2SS). If she saw it and left 
it there it indicates friendship for Mrs. Ballard and not 
antagonism. 
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Mrs. Ballard further stated that at the time he is 
supposed to have given her the deed he said: 
" 'You have earned it and you deserve it.' 
And he said Mrs. Brooke, he called her Annie, 
he s.aid, 'She is no blood relative of mine,' and 
he says, 'that she could buy you and I out several 
times' and he said, 'I don't owe her anything and 
I don't owe the Richmonds anything,' he said, 'but 
they think that they own 1ne.' " (Tr. 292). 
With respect to the deed she testified: 
"He said 'You can go and have it recorded if 
you want to but,' he says, 'you might have trouble 
but,' he says, 'you keep this in your presence .al-
ways until I go.' And then he says, 'You can have 
it recorded,' you can have it recorded at the time 
he said, 'but it might cause you some trouble.'" 
(Tr. 292-293). 
The confidence which lVIr. Outcalt had in the Rich-
monds is borne out by the fact that they took care of 
his business affairs all through his sickness until the 
time of death. They deposited his money and wrote the 
checks when he wasn't able to do so. They had had a 
power of attorney since 1949. The .authorizations to draw 
money and write checks are dated in March and April1953 
and were never revoked (Exhibit 6 and 7). The only will 
known to them (Exhibit 3) provided nothing for the 
Richmonds except that Mr. Richmond should be the 
executor. He was again named executor in the olographic 
will which has been admitted to probate. Mr. Richmond, 
as well as 1\frs. Brooke, participated in raising Mrs. 
Ballard's pay from $25 per month to $100 per 
month in July 1954. We submit that there was no basis 
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for any claim of antagonism on the part of the Rich-
monds. They served only as good neighbors to Mr. Out-
calt and co-operated with Mrs. Ballard in taking care 
of him. The claimed antagonism is entirely of Mrs. Bal-
lard's own making and is contrary to the undisputed 
facts. 
F. THIRD-PARTY TESTIMONY REGARDING EXECU-
TION OF DEED. 
~Irs. Ballard called seven witnes.ses who purported 
to give conversations with 1\{r. Outcalt supporting the 
claimed fact that he had deeded the property to Mrs. 
Ballard. These witnesses were : Virgil M. Taylor, Sarah 
Ann Sexton \Vest, Pearl Foster, Amy Pratt Romney, 
~lay ~Iarkham, Thelma Taylor and Clark H. \\.,.est. Most 
of these people were close personal friends of Mrs. Bal-
lard. X eyertheless their testimony, considering that they 
were called by ~Irs. Ballard, is as significant for the 
plaintiff as for the defendant. 
Yirgil ~L Taylor lived across the street from llr. 
Outcalt for 10 years (Tr. 198). He testified that in 1952 
~r r. Outcalt said that, "lie would be glad to give some-
one the balance of his estate when he died if they would 
take care of hiin for the rest of his life (Tr. 200-202). 
He ~aid he neyer Yisited ~Ir. Outcalt after ~Irs. Ballard 
c<une ( Tr. ~0~-~03). These conYersations being long be-
fore the supposed deed and eYen before the olographic 
will proved nothing with regard to the execution and 
delivery of the deed. The olographic will shows a com-
piPt<' change of 1nind if in fact he had such an intent. 
Sarah Ann Sexton \Yest lives at 536 East Second 
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South and has known Mrs. Ballard for 40 years (Tr. 
204). She testified that while Mrs. Ballard was at the 
hospital for a few days Mr. Outcalt had said, " 'I hope 
Ivie comes back from the hospital and can stay with 
me as long as I live.' ... 'And I am giving her this place, 
deeding this place to her if she stays with me until the 
last.'" This was in December of 1955 (Tr. 206); 
Though this was more than a year after the deed, 
it was only a statement of future intention and was 
conditioned on her staying with him. It negatives the fact 
that he had given a deed. 
Pearl Foster living at 50 East Fifth South had pre-
viously lived next door to Mr. Outcalt (Tr. 237). She had 
known Mrs. Ballard since 1951 (Tr. 238). Mrs. Foster 
testified, "Well he told me that he was thinking about 
leaving his home to Mrs. Ballard" (Tr. 240). Mrs. Foster 
could not fix the exact time of this conversation, but 
said, "I imagine maybe it w.as '54. I'm not sure" (Tr. 
241). She also said it was around the time Mrs. Ballard's 
brother died (Tr. 240). This date was never established. 
In response to the judge's questions she said she was 
not sure of the year (Tr. 243). 
Mrs. Amy Pratt Romney who lives at 1523 East 
Ninth South (Tr. 245) testified that when Mr. Outcalt 
moved from his home in Cottonwood he lived in the 
Romney's apartment for a period of 18 months to two 
years ( Tr. 245). He moved from their home when he 
purchased the residence at Sixth East and Redondo 
Avenue (Tr. 245). She and her husband (Mr. Gaskell 
Romney, now deceased) used to visit the Outcalts (Tr. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
245). Their last visit was around Christmastime of 1954 
( Tr. 249). Mr. Romney said, "You seem to be taken 
care of very well and I feel that it would be very sad 
if you didn't make things worthwhile for Mrs. Ballard 
after your demise." She then testified, "Mr. Outcalt's 
reply was that Mrs. Ballard had been very kind to him 
and had kept things in very good order and that he, now 
I don't say whether he said, 'I have' or 'I will see to it 
that Mrs. Ballard is well cared for after my demise" (Tr. 
248). 
This conversation was about three months after the 
supp<>sed deed. ~Ir. Outcalt, though Mr. Romney insisted 
that ~Irs. Ballard was very de.serving and things should 
be worthwhile for her, said nothing about a deed. :Mrs. 
Romney was questioned extensively on the witness stand 
for more favorable testimony, but none was forthcoming. 
l\Ir. Outcalt's statement is much more consistent with 
the olographic will adlnitted to probate than with havmg 
given any deed. The mutual esteem between llr. Outcalt 
and :JI r. Romney would haYe called for a statement with 
regard to the deed if Jlr. Outcalt had intended to give, 
or known or thought he had given a deed. 
nfay l\iarkham, who lives at 308 East Second South 
and ha~ known nirs. Ballard since 19:2S, stated that in 
the first week in October of 1954, ~Ir. Outcalt said, "And 
[ ha.vt> provided for ~irs. Ballard that she will be well 
taken eartl of when I go for her kindness and for her 
loving can' for n1e" (Tr. :255). This is no 1nore evidence 
of the deed than of the olographic will. 
Thehna '1_1aylor testified that she liYed at 2013 South 
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Sixth East. She asked Mr. Outcalt if he had taken care 
of Mrs. Ballard and he said, "Yes, I have. But don't 
tell the neighbors." This was in October 1954 (Tr. 259). 
There w.as nothing with respect to any deed or any spe-
cific date. 
Clark H. West testified that he resided at 526 East 
Second South and has known Mrs. Ballard for 43 years 
(Tr. 260-261). He testified with regard to a conversation 
about Mrs. Ballard in February 1955 that, " ... I have 
provided for her and nobody can take this home aw.ay 
from her." (Tr. 265). 
The only persons out of these seven who testified 
to anything which would indicate that a deed had been 
given were the Wests. They were friends of Mrs. Ballard 
of 40-years standing and were her close neighbors. None 
of the others testified to any conversation which indi-
cates that a deed had been given and in each instance 
:Mr. Outc.alt, if he were trying to reassure friends of 
.Nirs. Ballard that he was taking care of her would cer-
tainly have mentioned giving her the property or a deed 
to it. This is particularly true of the Romneys, Mr. 
Romney having twice pressed Mr. Outcalt for reassur-
ance that Mrs. Ballard would be taken care of. 
Some inference might be drawn from the fact that 
these people were concerned about l\Irs. Ballard. There 
were others who were giving time and attention without 
pay. Mrs. Ballard's services were obvious, the others 
were not. None of them knew that Mrs. Ballard w.as re-
ceiving pay and of course none of them knew that she 
was a beneficiary of one-third of the residue of the estate. 
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In any event the testimony of these seven witnesse.s taken 
a.s .a whole, considering their friendship for Mrs. Ballard, 
the solicitations for her welfare and the opportunity for 
disclosure of the deed, does as much to disprove her 
case as to prove it. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1 
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS THE FINDING OF THE 
COURT. 
POINT 2 
EXHIBIT 11 WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED. 
POINT 3 
ADMISSION OF EXHIBIT 11 IS NONPREJUDICIAL. 
POINT 4 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE RELIEF. 
ARGF~IEXT 
POINT 1 
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS THE FINDING OF THE 
COURT. 
\Vhile this is an equity case in which tllis court may 
exarnine the record it should not be forgotten that the 
trial judge sa"· and heard the witnesses. Characteristics 
of thr witnPssPs are displayed at the trial wllich cannot 
be rPI'IPch•d in the record. \Yhile we do not kno'v precisely 
what PvideneP .see1ned most i1nportant to the trial judge, 
on r a rgnmrnt that the deed was iinproperly secured is 
as follows: 
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:Mrs. Ballard was definitely motivated in taking care of 
Mr. Outcalt by a pecuniary interest in his property. Be-
fore deciding to care for Mr. Outcalt, she determined 
that he had approximately $5,000.00 in cash or its equiv-
alent besides the residence in which he was living. He 
was in hi.s middle 80's and in poor health, suffering from 
an incurable tumor. She procured a codicil to his will 
which would pay her well, considering his probable 
length of life. His life expectancy could not have been 
long. That she was capable of exerting pressure on Mr. 
Outcalt is indicated by the fact that she had the codicil 
drawn by her ·own attorney, taking possession of the 
codicil and retaining it until his death. He was not per-
mitted to place it in his safety box where he kept the 
will which the codicil amended. There is no doubt that 
there was something secretive about it. On January 4, 
1954, four days after the signing of the codicil he revoked 
it by an olographic will which is now .admitted to probate 
without contest. Mr. Outcalt put this document in his 
safety box at the bank. 
~Irs. Ballard testified that she was fully aware of 
the terms of the codicil which did not contemplate that 
she be paid by the month. The pay she received was 
contrary to its terms. To have told the Richmonds th.at 
she wasn't entitled to monthly payments under the sup-
posed agreement would have required the disclosure of 
the codicil. This she did not want to do, even though the 
Richmonds had no pecuniary interest in the prior will. 
In July 1954 the pay was increased to $100.00 per month 
because of added service. Whether she earned more or 
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less than she was paid is not material. It is material 
that such pay was not included in the terms of the codicil 
and she had reason to believe its provisions for her were 
in je·opardy. 
When Mr. Outcalt recovered from his serious illness 
of July and August 1954, he was able to consummate 
the sale of property to Mr. Siggard. His prospect for 
extended life temporarily increased. At that time he ar-
ranged to have the Siggard deeds prepared and he signed 
them. It will be noticed that his signatures on these deeds 
are clear and firmly written. He had the deeds prepared 
in the usual way by ~Iary Glen. His recovery no doubt 
caused some concern on the part of Mrs. Ballard as to 
how long he might live and whether to comply with the 
codicil she might be required to use her own money for 
his support. So she procured the deed. This would pro-
tect her against failure to perform under the codicil, 
either by having received pay as she went along or 
against failure to use her own money. In using her own 
n1oney, she would have been required to disclose the 
term~ of the codicil to ~Ir. Outcalt's other friends. This 
for the reason that the Riclunonds were paying the bills. 
The peculiarities of this deed n1ust be noted. :Jirs. 
Glen wa~n't called in to type the deed, as had been done 
eight da~·~ before. :J[r. Outcalt undoubtedly had a deed 
or abstract frmn wrhich he would nonnally ha,·e taken 
tiH' description. The description was taken from a tax 
uot i<'t'. The ~ignatnn• on tlw deed (Exhibit 1) is \NY 
::;lmk~· and i~ decidedly inferior to an~- other signatures 
both before and after Septe1nber 30, 1954. The signatures 
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to be compared are to be found on Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 
9, 10, 11 and 12. Mrs. Ballard administered the drugs 
which, as testified by the doctor, would result in a period 
of incompetency. 
The deed is further irregular in that it recites no 
consideration, no one saw him sign except Mrs. Ballard, 
and it w.as improperly witnessed and acknowledged by 
Mrs. Ballard's friends and neighbors. At the time of 
the witnessing and acknowledging Mrs. Ballard traveled 
in a car driven by her daughter. The notary, Mrs. Esther 
T. Luchesi, objected to taking the acknowledgment. Mrs. 
Ballard could easily have driven Mrs. Luchesi to the 
home of Mr. Outc.alt only two miles distance and have 
had Mr. Outcalt personally acknowledge the deed. Her 
daughter's car was immediately available. Instead of this 
she drove to Mr. Dent's house. She was then able to 
secure a witness and the notarization. She then retained 
the deed in her own possession until .after his death, at 
which time she recorded it. Knowledge of the deed was 
withheld from all persons except the daughter, the witness 
and the notary. The deed recites no consideration, the 
name of the county is not inserted in the acknowledg-
ment, and the signature of the notary is misplaced. 
There was an attempt to make a point of the fact 
that the Siggard deeds were not acknowledged before 
a Notary public and that Mr. Outcalt was fully aware 
of this fact. The two witnesses who signed those deeds saw 
.Mr. Outcalt sign them. They had no pecuniary interest in 
the matter and the deeds were given pursuant to a con-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
tract which Mr. Outcalt had entered into for the sale of 
property. Mr. Outcalt was fully paid. 
There is no evidence outside of Mrs. Ballard's own 
testimony that anyone would have opposed Mr. Outcalt's 
doing that which he wanted to do with his property. He 
had friends no doubt who would oppose his doing some-
thing under pressure or undue influence. These friends 
voluntarily participated in raising ~Irs. Ballard's pay, 
which diminished his estate. Their first concern was his 
welfare while he lived. The Richm.onds who were hand-
ling Mr. Outcalt's affairs had no reason to believe that 
they were or would be the beneficiaries of his will. The 
only thing that ~Irs. Ballard had to fear was that Mr. 
Outcalt himself had done something against his own 
desires. 
That he had done something again.st his own desires 
was indicated by the olographic will and the letter of Dec. 
1, 193-!, Exhibit 11. There is no question but that the 
estate which ~Ir. Outcalt intended to leave included his 
residence. All other property is valued at less than 
$1,000.00. Only a Sinall part of this is in cash and the 
rmnainder has no ready 1narket. Fron1 tins must be paid 
tlH' rxpenses of last illness. funeral expenses and cost of 
probate. \rould .Jlr. Outcalt lwYe intended to give one-
third of t lw residue of $1,000.00 to· ~Irs. Ballard, one-
third to Annie Brooke and the other one-third to be 
divided among eight friends·? 
rplH•rp was son1e argnmrnt in the trial court as to 
tlw nmtPrialit~· of the letter of Dece1nber 1, 1954 (Exhibit 
11) h<'<':lHS<' it did not specifically refer to the deed as 
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an instrument to be ignored and cancelled. If Mr. Out-
calt's mind was in .a clouded condition from drugs, pain 
or otherwise, he would not necessarily have known what 
he had signed. A recollection that he had signed some-
thing under pressure would be expected. His mind was 
clear when he wrote the letter and referred to his olo-
graphic will as the instrument of final distribution of 
his property. 
We would like to call attention of the court to one 
instance which illustrates a willingness on the part of 
Mrs. Ballard to go to any length to sustain her case. 
Exhibit 17 was introduced by her counsel as the draft of 
the codicil which Mr. Outcalt is supposed to have read 
and corrected in his handwriting. The only corrections 
were an item stricken out and the insertion of the initial 
"B" in Mr. Outcalt's name. It had been suggested that 
this draft had been read and corrected by Mr. Outcalt 
in his handwriting. The following are the questions and 
answers: 
"Q. Was it returned with those penciled no-
tations~ 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. Do you know who made those~ 
''A. Mr. Outcalt." (Tr. 221) 
That this was his handwriting is claimed in her brief 
where it is stated at page 16, "She later returned it to 
his office with some penciled corrections Inade by Mr. 
Outcalt." 
An examination of the inserted "B" on Exhibit 17 
and a comparison with the "B" of the signatures of Mr. 
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Outcalt shows such a marked difference that there is 
no possibility of their having been written by the same 
person. 
The plaintiff necessarily could not re-enact the scene 
when the deed was signed to show Mr. Outcalt's mental 
condition or the pressure and influence exerted upon 
him by Mrs. Ballard. The nature of this case and similar 
cases never permits of such proof. The following authori-
ties deal with the proof required by a plaintiff in such 
cases and also with the question of presumption of in-
validity where the relationship is such as existed between 
Mr. Outcalt and Mrs. Ballard. 
In the case of Howard rs. Carter, 80 Pac. 61, the 
action was to set aside a deed to real estate to two sons-
in-law of the decedent. The decedent at the time of the 
deed was 76 years old and in poor health. \Yith regard to 
the evidence required to set aside such a deed, the court 
said: 
"3. At the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence 
a de1nurrer was interposed thereto and overruled. 
It is claimed that there was no eYidence warrant-
ing the setting aside of the deeds, because there 
was nothing to show that these deeds had been 
obtained by undue persuasion or influence by 
Howard and Clark or their "iYes. The allegation 
of the petition was that while Schuster was weak, 
both bodilY and Inentalh-. and thus easilY influ-
enced, the defendants Clark and Howard, '~ith the 
assistance of their wiYes. 'coaxed, persuaded, and 
unduly influenced him. the snid Conrad Schuster, 
to ronve~· and deed to the1n all his real estate.' 
Tlwn~ was no spt.:~eific evidence whateYer of any 
eoaxing, persuasion. or undue influence. It was 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
shown that while Conrad Schuster was in a weak 
and mentally unsound condition he made these 
deeds, conveying all of his property to his two 
sons-in-law, without any consideration whatever 
therefor. We are of the ·opinion that this was suffi-
cient evidence to be considered by the court upon 
the issue presented by the petition. In the nature 
of things, it would be a rare case where the details 
of conversation or conduct could be shown, indi-
cating undue persuasion and influence, as such 
arts would be exercised only in the absence of 
witnesses, or, at most, in the presence of those 
whose interest and inclination would impel to their 
denial. \V e may as well judge of the cause from 
an effect, as of the effect from a cause. The fact 
that one mentally infirm does these things might 
of itself lead to the fair and just conclusion that 
he was impelled thereto by undue persuasion and 
influence, and, this fact being proven, we think 
it sufficient to sustain the allegation of the peti-
tion. Paddock v. Pulsifer, 43 Kan. 718, 23 Pac. 
1049; Hill v. Miller, 50 Kan. 659, 32 Pac. 354." 
See also Hill v. Miller 32 Pac. 354; Smith v. Smith, 
11-t Pac. 2-15; Omega Investment Co. v. Woolley, 72 Utah 
-174, 271 Pac. 797; Bank of America, etc. v. Crawford, 
160 P. :2d 169; Miller v. Proctor, 24 Tenn. App. 439, 145 
S.W. 2d 807; Gilbert v. Marquis, 61 R.I. 302, 200 Atl. 
959 ~ Corporation of Latter-day Saints v. Watson, 25 Utah 
-15, 69 Pac. 531 and Miller v. Livingstone, 31 Utah -t 15, 
88 Pac. 388. 
The last case cited is of interest as it indicates that 
under the facts in this case Mrs. Ballard would have 
had the burden to prove the validity of the codicil. !-lead-
note 3 of that case states: 
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"3. SAME. The sole beneficiary in a will 
gave instructions for the will and directed its 
terms. It was drawn at her request. Held, that the 
will must be regarded as having been written by 
the beneficiary within the rule casting suspicion 
on .a will drawn at the request and direction of 
the sole beneficiary which may be sufficient to 
prevent the probate thereof unless the suspicion 
is removed. " 
POINT 2 
EXHIBIT 11 WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED. 
·The letter written by William B. Outcalt on Decem-
ber 1, 1954 was just sixty-two days after the date of 
the purported deed. The letter is written in a much 
firmer handwriting than the signature on the deed, and 
there was never any question as to his handwriting. 
The letter states : 
"December 1, 1954 
"To the Administrator of l\Iy Estate 
"Please settle my estate according to the 
terms of my olographic will written and signed 
by me last January. The provisions of this will 
are just to all concerned and I wish them carried 
~out, ignoring and cancelling all other papers which 
I may have signed under undue pressure and fear 
of being left alone. 
\Yillian1 B. Outcalt" 
By directing his adnlinistrator to carry out the pro-
visions of his olographie will and to ignore and cancel 
all other papers, ''which I may haYe signed under undue 
pressure and fear of being left ,alone,~· ~Ir. Outcalt plainly 
had referC'lH'P to thE' po~~ihility of his haYing signed 
some instru1nent din•sting hin1self of n1ost of his estate. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
31 
It is too plain for labored argument that the letter of 
December 1, 1954 is relevant to the issues of undue in-
fluence and abuse of a confidential relation.ship that 
were tried in this lawsuit. The weight of the evidence 
is a matter of argument. 
There is at the present date, a great number of de-
cisions which have followed and elaborated upon the 
rule laid down by this court in Mower v. Mower, 64 Utah 
260, 228 Pac. 911, to the effect that subsequent (or prior) 
declarations made by a grantor or donor, etc., are ad-
missible in an equity case on the issue of intent and it is 
immaterial that such statements are self serving and 
hearsay declarations. 
California: Williams v. K idd, 170 Cal. 631, 151 Pac. 1; 
Piercey v. Piercey, 18 Cal. App. 751,124 Pac. 
561; Whitlow v. Durst, 20 Cal. 2d 523, 127 P. 
2d 530; Dinneen v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 2d 
200, 134 P. 2d 323; Katz v. Enos, 68 Cal. App. 
2d 266, 156 P. 2d 461; Sprague v. Walton, 
145 Cal. 228, 78 Pac. 645; McNulty v. Copp, 
91 Cal. App. 2d 484, 205 P. 2d 438; Hansen 
v. Bear Film Co., 28 Cal. 2d 154, 168 P. 2d 
946; Casey v. Casey, (Cal. 1950) 218 P. 2d 
842; Schnepfe v. Schnepfe, (Cal. 1953) 261 
P. 2d 321; Emden v. Verdi, (Cal. 1954) 269 
P. 2d 47. 
Idaho: Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 68 Ida. 470, 199 P. 
2d 264 . 
.. 7J1ontana: Thompson v. Steinkamp, 120 Mont. 475, 187 
P. 2d 1018. 
New Mexico: Schultz v. Young, 37 N.M. 427, 24 P. 2d 276. 
Utah: Mower v. Mower,64 Utah260, 228 P,ac. 911; 
Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 P. 
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2d 355; Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 
P. 2d 465; First Security Bank v. Burgi, 122 
Utah 443, 251 P. 2d 297. 
See also the annotation at 34 A.L.R. 2d. 592. 
There is a well recognized rule of law that the solem-
nity of deeds cannot be later attacked by parol testimony. 
Ruthrauff, et al. v. Silver King Western Min. and Mill 
Co., 95 Utah 279,80 P. 2d 338; Williams v. Kidd, 170 Cal. 
631, 151 Pac. 1 (cited in the Mower case). But this legal 
policy assun1es that the deed has been duly executed and 
delivered with all the proper formalties of law. \Vbere 
an action raises equitable issues such as fraud, mistake, 
undue influence or abuse of a confidential relationship, 
which cases necessarily involve the question of a valid 
delivery as well as execution, the cases cited above have 
all admitted so-called self-serving hearsay declarations. 
The instant case is more favorable to such ruling because 
the statement is not oral but in the handwriting of the 
supposed grantor. 
There is no doubt whatsoever that "\Villiam B. Out-
calt wrote the letter of December 1st (Tr. 1-10). Thus 
the historic objection that a hearsay staten1ent may be 
erroneously reported or repeated by the witness, is elimi-
nat,ed. This case deals with a quitclain1 deed, highly 
questionable in every circu1nstance. Just like the day 
when defendant took Thfr. Outcalt to her attorne·y· to have 
a will drawn in her favor, this ti1ne the defendant went to 
her own close aeqaintance to have the deed typed, rather 
than to l\1 a r~· ( Hrn, who typed the Siggard deeds tlw 
week before. There wa~ no actual witnessing of the deed, 
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nor acknowledgment. And therefore the protection of Mr. 
Outcalt's free exercise of his will and intent that our 
statutes on acknowledgments were designed to provide, 
was removed. 57-2-8 to 15, inclusive, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953. The language of the Mower case is particu-
larly apt to this situation. 
"It would seem on principle to say that these 
statements are self serving and inadmissible after 
the delivery of the deed is really begging the ques-
tion. It may be conceded that they are inadmissi-
ble after the delivery of the deed but the real issue 
here is, were the deeds ever legally delivered? If 
we assume the declarations are not admissible 
because the deeds have been delivered, then we are 
settling the issue of delivery without evidence or 
trial." (64 Utah at 268) 
It is clear that the question of Mr. Outcalt's free 
exercise of his own volition in executing and delivering 
the deed is a matter, indistinguishable from the question 
of intent in delivering a deed in the Mower case. There 
cannot be a valid delivery of a deed that was procured 
through undue influence. 
The Utah decision of Smith v. Hanson, 34 Utah 171, 
96 Pac. 1088, cited in appellant's brief, is distinguished 
from the Mower case by the per curiam opinion written 
on Rehearing therein, 64 Utah at 272. 
The case of Ruthrauff, et al. v. Silver King Western 
.~.lfining and Mill Company, et al., 95 Utah 279, 80 P. 2d 
338, cited by appellant is consistent with the ruling of 
the trial court herein. It was an action to quiet title to a 
certain mining claim. It was undisputed that Charles B. 
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Ruthr.auff and wife executed a deed to Rose Brown, valid 
in all respects, quitclaiming an undivided one-fourth in-
terest in the Augusta Lode mining claim. Thereafter 
Ruthrauff's heirs claimed that the deed did not divest 
the grantor of the interest he held in the property, but 
was merely intended to release to Rose Brown the one-
fourth interest in the property which she had held, but 
which had been invalidly sold for taxes. The Supreme 
Court held that "unless the intent and meaning of the 
deed is upon its f.ace uncertain or obscure," no recourse 
could be taken to such facts as subsequent asserted owner-
ship by the grantor. 
"So far as appears, Mr. Ruthrauff, the grant-
or, never claimed there was fraud, accident or 
mistake in the deed during the more than ten 
years he lived thereafter. His heirs in .all the 
26 years since his death in 1912 until this suit, 
never questioned it .... No one was produced as 
a witness to testify so as to throu· any light on 
intent at the time, aside from the deed itself .... 
No issue is tendered on which to impress an equit-
able interest upon the legal title now held by an-
other. The attempt to read into the later tax 
records .a controlling effect over a prior express 
deed of their ancestor cannot prevail. . . . It is 
sufficient to say, giving to the deed in question 
its due legal effect, that title to the interest for-
merly held and owned by Charles C. Ruthrauff 
(to the extent of 375 feet or less) passed thereby 
to Rose Brown .... " 95 Ptah at :291 (En1phasis 
added.) 
POINT 3 
ADMISSION OF EXHIBIT 11 IS NONPREJUDICIAL. 
In disrnssing this point we do not adn1it that Exhibit 
1 t and Exhibit 1:2. being the envelope containing Exhibit 
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11, were erroneously admitted. H~owever, it is our posi-
tion that even if they may have been incompetent evi-
dence it was nonprejudicial error. First, because the evi-
dence sustains the finding of the trial court without Ex-
hibit 11 and second, the defendant gave evidence of trans-
actions which would otherwise have been inadmissible 
under the dead man statute if Exhibit 11 had not been 
admitted. The trial court held that Exhibit 11 constituted 
a waiver of the dead man statute, Section 78-24-2, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. Pursuant to the waiver the de-
fendant introduced the supposed conversations between 
her and the decedent regarding the deed. 
A review of the record with regard to the theory 
on which the court admitted Exhibit 11 and the conversa-
tions between the defendant and the decedent will be 
helpful. We refer first to page 140 of the transcript 
where the court stated the theory upon which Exhibit 11 
was admitted. The court said: 
". . . You see this is a statement of the de-
ceased. The very issue in this case is whether or 
not he was imposed upon or whether he knew what 
he was doing. That is the issue. Now can there 
be better evidence than what his own mind was 
by his own statement~ Now if a witness were 
testifying that he had said that of course, true, 
they couldn't testify as to whether or not that was 
his state of mind. They could only testify that 
that is what he said was his state of mind. It 
seems to me that where the issue is as to that 
mental status of the deceased and that is the very 
crux ,of this case and you have a statement by 
him in writing, about which there is no contest 
that it was his writing, I don't know how you could 
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get a better insight as to what his mind was than 
to what he says it wa.s." (Tr. 140-141). 
This theory of the court is in line with Mower v. 
Mower, supra, .and with the other authorities set forth 
in our preceding point. 
Mr. Macfarlane had asked questions with regard to 
the conversations with the deceased about the deed in 
question and the court had, during the first part of the 
trial excluded the testimony. It is intere.sting that coun-
sel for defendant argued that there being no jury the 
evidence should be .admitted and the court could disre-
gard such evidence as might be held incompetent. Mr. 
Macfarlane, Jr., stated : 
"I think we ought to maybe have an oppor-
tunity to take a look at that. Unfortunately \Ye 
didn't before but this will be important and of 
course there being no jury the Court could always 
disreg.ard it if at some subsequent time it should 
be determined that it is incompetent." (Tr. 222). 
Before the trial was concluded the court held that 
the introduction of Exhibit 11 was a waiver of the dead 
man statute by the plaintiff and l\Irs. Ballard was per-
mitted to testify with regard to the entire transaction. 
In making its ruling the court said: 
"Well, it is the same situation, :Jir. Cannon, 
that I think the Burke Y. Peters case (Burk v. 
Peter, 115 Utah 58, 202 P. 2d 5±3) covers and I 
think that theory is that it is a waiYer and that 
lettPr is, you see that letter he has written to be 
opened after hi~ dcn7~l c.ast~ a doubt on all of this 
tran~aetion, if it applies to it at all. And he has 
said in that letter that he has been in1posed upon. 
'Yell, he i~ ~pPaking, and to the extent that he 
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speaks this c.ase as I understand it, hold that it 
qualifie.s her to speak. She has the right to explain 
or rebut or contest that speaking that he has done 
through that letter, and that is the the·ory of the 
case." (Tr. 289). 
Following this statement, counsel for defendant had 
Mrs. Ballard testify as to the supposed conversation be-
tween her and the deceased when he gave her the deed. 
It is certain from the ruling of the court and from the 
entire record that the only theory upon which her con-
versation with the deceased could be given was a waiver 
of the de.ad man statute by the introduction of Exhibit 
11. We do not know to what extent the letter and the sup-
posed conversations influenced the trial judge in the 
final decision. If there was error on one side then there 
was error on both sides. There is no need to decide the 
single question of whether or not the trial judge was 
correct in his ruling that the introduction of Exhibit 11 
was a waiver of the dead man statute as the decision w.as 
entirely in favor of the plaintiff. It is conclusive, however, 
from the trial judge's own theory and the entire record 
of the case that defendant could not have testified as to 
her conversation with regard to the deed unless Exhibit 
11 had been admitted. 
The following is the rule with regard to the ad-
mission of incompetent evidence in an equity case if the 
findings, in the opinion of the appellate court should 
not be altered without such evidence. 
"§1039.-EQUITY CASES.-The rules gov-
erning the effect of the erroneous admission or re-
jection of evidence in equity cases are much the 
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same as those governing the effect in other trials 
without a jury. The admission of incompetent evi-
dence is not of itself reversible error; to be rever-
sible error, it must be prejudicial. The admission 
is not error if the decree is sustained by other 
competent evidence or if the same facts are prop-
erly in evidence. It will be presumed that the 
court gave the incompetent evidence no effect,-
at least the appellate court may disregard the 
testimony and render such judgment as equity 
and justice require." 3 Am. Jur., Appeal and 
Error, Sec. 1039. 
POINT 4 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE RELIEF. 
This part of the brief is in answer to Point III of 
appellant's brief. The question raised by the appellant 
is whether ·or not there i.s an obligation to ''do equity" 
by reason of the claimed agreement between ~Ir. Outcalt 
and Mrs. Ballard which was embodied in the codicil. Ap-
pellant stated : 
"It is undisputed that Outcalt contracted for 
the services of ~Irs. Ballard; that in pursuance 
of said contract a codicil was executed: that Out-
calt secretly repudiated the contract by revoking 
the codicil in an olographic will executed four 
days later: ... 
". . . She kept her bargain in a re1narkably 
faithful .and devoted 1nanner and now the Exe-
cutor of Outcalt's estate seeks to aYoid the deed 
which furnished the consideration for which she 
has labored and which in effect would take from 
this wmnan the property pron1ised for her labors" 
(A p pe llan f s brief, pa,:.:;es .J-t-3G). 
rrhis a rgnment illustrates the confusion of the appel-
lant as to the issues of the east>. Inconsistent with the 
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"Statement of the Case" by appellant, appellant's theory 
has been as if she were entitled to enforce the terms of a 
contract or of the codicil. It will be recalled that the 
codicil has not been admitted to probate but on the con-
trary the subsequent ologr.aphic will has been admitted 
to probate and the time for contest has elapsed. No 
claim was filed as a necessary basis for the enforcement 
of any contract between the appellant and the deceased. 
There was no b.asis for the defendant to prove a contract 
and no need for plaintiff to go into the question of the 
validity of such contract, the validity of the codicil or 
whether or not Mrs. Ballard performed under the same. 
By the terms of the agreement Walker Bank & Trust 
Company was to have been the sole judge of whether or 
not she had performed her agreement if she was to re-
cover .anything under it or under the 0odicil. Walker 
Bank & Trust Company has not been asked by her nor 
permitted to make such a determination. Appellant's 
argument is therefore founded upon a misconception of 
the issues in this case. 
There is some suggestion of an agreement entered 
into between Mrs. Ballard and the deceased when she 
secured the deed, he supposedly having requested her 
to remain with him until his death and she having agreed 
to this. Appellant's Point III, that plaintiff is not en-
titled to equitable relief unless equity is done is neces-
sarily based upon the premise that plaintiff is otherwise 
entitled to equitable relief. It therefore presumes the 
invalidity of the deed itself. If by reason of duress, sick-
ness, incompetency or imposition by the defendant the 
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deed is invalid, there cannot have been any valid agree-
ment or contract between the parties simultaneously 
therewith. The argument under Point III so far as any 
contract or agreement which .she claims to have made 
with the decedent in connection with the deed must fall 
of its own weight under a finding that the deed was in-
valid. If the deed is valid the question does not arise. 
Furthermore, the maxim that plaintiff must do 
equity in order to be entitled to relief is not a hard and 
fast rule. Nor is a party entitled under such rule to 
claim legal rights. The rule is stated in the case of Pan-
American Petroleum Co. v. United States, 9 F. 2d 761, 
~s follows: 
"We .are unable to affirm the court below in 
holding that the United States, in order to obtain 
the relief which it sought, is required to credit 
the defendants with the sums which they expended 
under the leases and contracts, and in holding ap-
plicable to the case the maxim that he who seeks 
equity must do equity. That maxim is as old as 
equity itself, and is of almost universal applica-
tion. It means that he who seeks the aid of an 
equitable court subjects himself to the imposition 
of such terms as the settled principles of equity 
require. But the maxim is only a guiding principle 
and not an exact rule governing all rases. Hanson 
v. Keating, 8 J ur. 949. In that case the Yire 
Chancellor .said: 
" 'It is .a rule which per se can by no possi-
hilit~· decide what the rights of the defendant are. 
It only raises the qr:.cstion what equity. if any, the 
defendant has against the plaintiff in the circum-
stances of the ease to which the rule is sought to 
be applied.'" 
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Mrs. Ballard has been treatE:ld equitably if that is a 
tnaterial question. She gave tip no employment or posi-
tion of advantage to tak~ care of Mr. Outcalt. She was 
given room and board. 'rhe pay was not large, but whether 
it shoiild have been tnore or less has not been determined 
by evidence directly on the :rna tter. When Mr. Outcalt 
was ambulatory she received $25 or more per month in 
addition to room and board. Appellant claims at page 4 
of her brief that his condition improved frotn August 
1953 until shortly before his death which would mean that 
he required very little care. The record, however, is 
co:tltrary to this and he was seriously ill in July and 
August of 1954 when her pay was increased to $100 per 
month. This continued through the end of 1954. She 
thereafter received substantially $75 per month. He re-
quired meals, which at times we will assume were at ir-
regular hours and he otherwise required the care of the 
usual bedfast patient. He was not an unkind ·or tyranni-
cal person. Evidence shows that he was very .appreciative 
of what was done for him. Mrs. Ballard is now to receive, 
in addition to the considerat1on above mentioned, one-
third of the residue of his estate. The estate will amount 
to between $9,000 and $10,000, it having been shown that 
the home is worth substantially $9,000 and there being 
some additional property. No one can feel that Mrs. 
Ballard has not been well treated. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings ·bf the trial cotirt are clearly sustained 
by the evidence. Plaintiff was not required to show by 
direct evidence that Mr. Outcalt was imposed upon at the 
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moment he signed the deed. This was shown by the re-
lationship of the parties, by the motives which defendant 
had to secure herself by the deed and by the strange 
circumstances as to its preparation, signing, supposed 
witnessing and acknowledgment. These are particularly 
strange when considering that Mary Glen usually pre-
pared his papers, that he was a man ·of orderliness and 
regularity in business affairs and that it would have 
been a simple matter to have the document regularly 
witnessed and acknowledged. The relationship of the par-
ties required proof by Mrs. Ballard of regularity. 
Exhibit 11 was properly admitted. Even so, it was 
only one piece of evidence consistent with the entire cir-
cumstances otherwise proving invalidity of the deed. Be-
cause of its admission defendant was permitted to testify 
as to her conversations .at the time of the deed which 
otherwise would not have been admissible. A reading 
of this record requires the same finding if Exhibit 11 
were eliminated. 
Equity and justice have been done for ~Irs. Ballard 
according to any reasonable standard. Of great import-
ance is the fact that the trial court has given effect to the 
intention of the decedent. The judg1nent of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully subnlitted, 
l\L\RR. \YILKIXS & C~\XXOX 
PAUL B. CAXNOX 
RICHARD H. XEBEKER 
'Aitorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
920 Continental Bank Building 
Salt L.ake City, Utah 
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